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Please enter at least three discussion comments or questions based on the assigned readings for the week. Consider how the various readings covered compliment/contradict one another or provide new ways of thinking about the topic in its entirety. Also consider how fire response changes across conditions and the most important variables to consider when planning for those processes.
Please submit your comments by noon on Monday. That will give our discussion leads adequate time to prepare for their duties.
Dunn 2020
ReplyDeleteThe paper mentions how fire suppression, changing climates, and other anthropogenic factors have led to increased smoke exposure for both surrounding communities and responders in regard to wildfires, as they have grown more intense across both geospatial and temporal scales. I would be interested to see the differences in smoke exposure quantified over a wide array of wildfire events to gain an understanding. Perhaps this is a good research question I can delve into. For instance, I would like to see the distinctions in particulate matter (i.e. PM 2.5) concerning areas of full suppression during wildfire and similar ecosystems that have been burned on a regular interval. Furthermore, to what extent does smoke exposure dictate in PODs?
Paveglio 2015
The paper details the culprits behind shared distrust between locals (typically in rural areas) and firefighters as well as its subsequent role in wildfire response. This leads me to ponder the instances I have been informed about with wildland firefighters who have traveled out of state and faced adverse reactions in many of these areas due to distrust with the government being a common occurrence. Depending on the state, responders may not be able to address a wildfire on a property without permission, and if they are, there may be further obstacles in the way due to state or local government laws. Response may not be able to be carried out in a timely fashion. Therefore, what do you think would be the advantages and disadvantages of changing legislation such as this and allowing responders (i.e. Incident Command System) full reign over doing what is necessary despite property boundaries? Do you think advantages would outweigh disadvantages? Or vice versa?
Steelman 2021
Figure 2 shows the perception of voice by principals under different network structures. One can see that joint delegation received the best perception of voice as 100% of the respondents believe they have a voice via that network structure. This begins to decline as joint delegation is intertwined with unified command and then even more so as it is unified command alone and later ad hoc. However, joint delegation coupled with unified command had a higher percentage of respondents say they had no voice when compared to unified command alone. I would think the presence of a joint delegation would yield the opposite effect. Do you agree? Is there something I may be missing? Or can it be ruled that there is a more complex system of perceptions at play?
Dunn et al. 2020: Given the results from this paper of “The resulting strategic response zones typically fall into one of three categories: (1) maintain, where wildfires are expected to provide positive benefits such that default strategies should be to manage fires for resource benefit, (2) restore, where wildfires may provide positive benefits under the right fire weather conditions, and (3) protect, where wildfires will result in negative outcomes such that aggressive suppression should be pursued when and where it is safe and effective.”, do you think this covers all the possible areas where fires may occur?
ReplyDeletePaveglio et al. 2015: One thing that was really honed in on in this paper was perceived experience as it relates to capacity, safety, and public risk (for example, thinking of the landowner wanting to protect his crops by cutting fireline with his tractor). How can we ensure we respect what the public might have to offer in terms of fire support while still accounting for their safety, without being able to know all of their experience, knowledge, etc. that they might possess? Is there a way to key in on this in other ways (as a contingency resource, to protect secondary priorities (cutting fireline around farmland and crops, etc.) that would let them help in a safer way? Why or why not? How might you propose bringing this about?
Given “one source of conflict during the fire stemmed from the range of values that residents have for the landscape, and the perception that the IC system was not able or willing to shift its rules of resource allocation toward the protection of these locally held values”, consider how this might be taken from a firefighter’s point of view who has been told that the safety of them and their crew is paramount, followed closely by safety of others around them (including the public), and finally by property (typically prioritizing housing, then other infrastructure). How might this be perceived. Can we really expect firefighters to shift their priorities from protecting life and the majority of the public’s interests (homes), to that of a smaller, but sometimes more relevant set of stakeholders (landowners, farmers, etc)? Though I am not discounting their importance or relevance at all, I thought it was important to contectualize this ask into the bigger picture and think of it both as a matter of safety and accountability as it relates to ICS.
How can we ensure safety/accountability while also promoting resiliency, particularly in areas with abundant fire knowledge, equipment, and preparedness measures in place? This thought is spurred by the resident’s comment in the study of “They had trouble up there with law enforcement. They wanted to block the roads and they wanted to keep people out. Well, people wanted to go out to get gas so they could run ... fire pumps, just like, most all of us have some sort of fire protection or fire pumps. They wouldn't let them come back in.” How do we find a good balance?
Steelman et al. 2021: I found that this study restated its importance time and time again throughout the first four pages, without making much of a point besides citing more sources… I kept asking myself “Why do we care? Does this really matter?”…this however finally stated changing seven pages in when the authors made the points of “this article fills this gap by providing empirical evidence related to what the representative mechanisms look like by answering the question: What are the governance structures that allow for representation of diverse interests on a jurisdictionally complex incident?” and “Regardless of whether representation occurs through direct engagement or delegated authority, the assumption remains that effective network governance requires diverse stakeholders to perceive their voice as represented in the decision-making.”. Further, they went on to state that “Our aim was to understand and explain how those without representation gained voice and those with representation felt they lost it.” and “those formally represented in the response organization were more likely to perceive they had voice.” which I think can be applicable to many fields, especially right now in times of turbulent politics, funding, etc.
ReplyDeleteSomething I thought was interesting in both this paper and the Paveglio et al. 2015 paper was the influence of title language. Paveglio et al.’s use of the phrase “put the wet stuff on the hot stuff” is one I’ve heard quite a bit before and has always made me think of the dismissal of complexity in understanding what wildland fire operations really entails. This made me immediately skew my judgement against wanting to read this paper subjectively, assuming it had this air of dismissal, ultimately leading for me to read Dunn’s first and then come back later to this one (though I actually really like it now and see the irony of utilizing this coined phrase in the title as we examine the juxtaposition of opinions within the study.). Steelman et al. utilizes the term “disaster” right in the title which I think is typically a mistake when addressing the public and land managers (and fire managers with a high proportion of high egos) as it makes it seem like 1) all “disaster” events are accidental (a large number of wildfires are intentionally lit, ie arson), 2) that we have no control over any of it (we do and we are the main reason land management is such a mess and has gotten to the state that it is and is fueling large fire growth and severity, and 3) that we can point the finger at these events and learn lessons of what not to do from them, but often fail to recognize their smaller successes.
Paveglio:
ReplyDeleteThis paper was published in 2015: has there been any effort in the last 10 years to collect and document information about conflicts between firefighting entities and local communities? For people with firefighting experience in the class, how important do you perceive this to be and/or what have your experiences been interacting with publics in different firefighting contexts? Could it also be helpful to implement some process for an after-incident review where members of IC teams and local communities come together to talk through what happened and get closure on issues/disagreements before the feelings of conflict become embedded in local culture?
Dunn:
There is a lot in here and I get a little overwhelmed by all the layers of maps. So, I suppose they could be useful for communicating with local partners/stakeholders about fire management decisions but its possible that they may be a bit complex for this purpose. What values are included in the eNVC/cNVC calculations? Is POD development the only point in this process where local knowledge and priorities are taken into account?
Steelman:
Can the process of creating PODs also help build understandings of micro structures (which I'm understanding to mean local relationships, communication strategies, expertise, etc.) that will interact with IC systems in the event of a fire? Understanding these dynamics could help ensure that local perspectives are represented and mitigate potential conflict during wildfire events.
Dunn '20:
ReplyDeleteFire managers navigating rigid federal policy, NEPA requirements, and potential high consequences/liability and publicity of failure do not incentivize adaptive management. How can managers be encouraged to take calculated risks?
Paveglio '15:
What other communities besides rural/agricultural might be against federal "outsider" fire resources? I thought of the anti-government back to the land environmentalist community from the Joint Chiefs paper earlier this year.
I'd also be interested to see how resident feelings would differ with prescribed burning as well. Last year I was helping out with a prescribed fire in the FL Keys. In the past, federal resources had "lost" a burn in this same area, and locals were semi-hostile to federal resources. There was also a local resident actively dumping water on the Rx out of concern for the turtle population. In this case, a strong sense of local community/shared history and environmental concerns led to angered residents.
Steelman '21:
“Look, I get it. You guys got a mission. My mission is different..." I think the conflicting missions of players involved in disaster response are a large roadblock to effective fire management. Sometimes a strong belief in one's agency mission can override loyalty or ties to the ICS. Another roadblock is the communication between different agencies. Federal crews operate off of a communications plan, and often local agency radios are not compatible with federal radios, inhibiting cooperation.
Steelman et al. 2021
ReplyDeleteWhy is it that negotiation happens at different levels in joint delegation of authority and unified command? Does this help or hinder collaboration?
Paveglio et al. 2015
As I talked about last week, it is not uncommon for firefighters to move across the country throughout the year prepositioning for and responding to wildfires in areas that they are not from nor familiar with. Upon arrival, they are briefed on local procedures. However, I have experienced it time and time again first hand in my forest that out of district resources don’t truly understand our forest. I hadn’t really before thought about interactions between non-local fire resources and local residents and how those interactions may influence their perceptions of the agency. One solution I thought of is to have more in depth, thorough briefings sharing even more local knowledge upon initial arrival.
Dunn et al. 2020
The combination of PCLS, eNCV, cNCV, suppression difficulty, PODs, etc. resulting in the three strategic response zone categories (1) takes a step in the direction of moving away from full suppression always and immediately, (2) highlights that different values at risk require different prioritizations, and (3) informs fire managers a big picture view to use in strategies and tactics.
Dunn:
ReplyDelete"By aligning POD boundaries with high probability potential control locations(figures 2(a), (b)), our intent is to increase the likelihood managers can effectively manage fire in accordance with values at risk." How easily can this be done? Data availability when fighting fires is critical, and having this information on a pre generated map would be incredibly informative. If this information had be generated on site taking time away from defending a zone, I feel it could be a less effective tool. How far in advance should these be set? And can they develop over time requiring new calculations?
Paveglio:
From the interviews it seems like there is a lot of animosity towards firefighters who responded to the 2005 fire. How can fire fighters do a better job of bridging the gap between themselves and the residents who live there? I feel like this barrier may always exist regardless of the connection the crew and citizens have. The reason I say this is because their priorities in the situation are vastly different. Fire fighters main objective is to contain the fire and prevent it from spreading, while the home owner will always be concerned with either their property or properties around theirs.
Steelman:
"Last, threatened and affected jurisdictions were actively engaged in the incident but sometimes not formally represented within the network governance organization. This leads to questions about mechanisms by which such actors gain voice and coordinate operations during the incident." When incidents do occur, are local representatives able to provide input to decision makers? Shouldn't there be a prioritization on finding locals who are familiar with the dynamics of fire and the landscape to aid in the development of plans?
Steelman 2021 - The paper talks about how different governance structures can affect representation and voice during complex disaster responses. I would be interested to see how these governance structures impact the involvement of various stakeholders in different disaster situations. For example, it would be helpful to measure how local, state, and federal stakeholders feel about their voice in decision-making during disasters. Also, how do different governance arrangements influence the communication and effectiveness of decisions made during a disaster response?
ReplyDeletePaveglio 2015 - How might the experiences of urban neighborhoods that have historically faced underinvestment in fire services compare to rural communities during wildfire emergencies? How might money and social status affect how these communities feel about working with federal firefighting teams, like whether they feel heard, helped, and in control?
Dunn 2020 - What can we do to stop fuel companies from using harmful chemicals that aren’t well regulated, like what happened in the MTBE case?
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ReplyDeleteDunn 2020:
ReplyDeleteI like how this paper points out the need for more co-adaptive management between the different agencies that have vested interests. I also like the use of the POD model breaking environments down into 3 different types of fire environments. Though, I struggle with that a software that has lots of layers, I can definitely see it’s usefulness for fire managers who would use the software regularly. It would be useful in guiding them when to suppress, when to guide the fire and when to just let it burn. Basically, giving a comprehensive risk assessment for wildfire management. Hopefully, the governing bodies will begin to see that legislation, through more advocation by professional fire managers, needs to have better defined outlines and that policies leave room for professionals in the field to adapt to the way the fires are moving and the environments where they’re occurring.
Paveglio 2015:
Rural communities have had to deal with being shunned or made fun of by faster paced cities for and citied as being slow or uneducated. When really their values are just different and they’re education values are focused elsewhere. which is mirrored in how they live their lives, typically independent of others help. They’ve also known to feel like they’ve been forgotten in elections because the cities have more voters. Therefore, those opinions are held to a higher esteem and sometimes policies are passed that work inside of a city but not in rural areas due to different values, or lack of resources, ect. There have also been instances where rural communities are promised something if they allow a certain thing to happen, but the bargain wasn’t held resulting in them being taken advantage of, which also feeds the major distrust of outside officials or management. We have definitely got the social science to back that representation matters. By representation I mean values, work ethics, beliefs systems, or vernaculars/dialects and based on the Columbia complex fire, that was all lacking, they did not know or how to reach the demographic that they were trying to help. (Saturation Theory at work) I think they would have done better to have a townhalls with the locals, opening up the floor to ask them what they had done in the past, who had experience, and they could have employed the farmers and their equipment under a fire manager’s guidance.
Steelman:
I definitely agreed with the paper pointing out the variations and effectiveness where no single government structure is going to universally ensure that there is efficient representation, it points back to what I think was found in Travis’s paper. How can active fire managers go into communities and make them feel heard now and let legislation catch up later? is it possible to do that?
1. What benefit lies in intermixing IC and evacuation outreach (or is this already the approach)? Can local culture about IC be predictive of evacuation preferences? Could a mentorship-like program effectively build community adaptive capacity—similar to an 'adopt a highway' mentality, but instead, it's firefighters adopting a neighborhood?
ReplyDelete2. Dunn et al. (2020) mentioned providing communication tools to assist with pre- and active-incident. I may have missed it, but what might this include? Are these modes of communication selected by the affected parties—or vice versa? What communication tools, if any, have been proven to be most effective for IC? Are IC communication procedures generalized, or are they community-catered?
3. What agency cultural forces might hinder micro-governing structures? After active incidents, what does the follow-up process look like? Are reports detailing decisions released to the public?
Dunn et al.:
ReplyDeleteThe authors discuss how “fire and land managers could manage fires for resource benefit in these landscapes, reducing their potential to transmit fire to adjacent jurisdictions or areas with higher assessed risk”. Could collaborating with local indigenous populations to understand timing of prescribed burns depending on plant species to give us a starting point?
Steelman et al.:
It was found that the ICS “has a bias against inclusiveness under conditions of urgency”, does this create cyclical patterns of behavior since we are reactive instead of proactive? I think of mental health as an example, a therapist provides a variety of “tools for your tool belt” because you never know which will be necessary in a given scenario. Could we provide something similar that allows for best approaches to be compiled in a “toolkit” that would allow for nuanced choice based on the areas issues/jurisdiction?
Paveglio et al.
Does the IC system consult with locals at all or do they come into the areas with a “ I know best” mentality? If they come into the area with this mentality, as we know from previous week’s readings, no one is happy. Those part of the IC system may have helpful resources but without an open-mind and collaborative nature it may not be received well by the locals. An example is assuming that homes are the most important aspect to save (other than human lives) which leaves the community at a deficit due to losing agricultural resources.So while the IC system may consider their work a win because they saved homes, the locals would think it was a failure due to the long-term loses of their agricultural yields.