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Please enter at least three discussion questions based on the assigned readings for the week. Consider how the various readings covered compliment/contradict one another or provide new ways of thinking about the topic in its entirety. Also consider how fire response changes across conditions and the most important variables to consider when planning for those processes.
Please submit your comments by noon on Monday. That will give our discussion leads adequate time to prepare for their duties.
While the article by Paveglio et al describes the ICS system as rigidly hierarchical and having a structure which contributed to on-the-ground conflicts in their case study, Steelman et al describe the same system as a flexible network with hierarchical elements. What contributes to this difference in perception/operation of the ICS system?
ReplyDeleteAside from structural questions, Steelman et al posit that the question of who and what is being governed during wildfire response is fundamental but neglected aspect of conversation around ICS. Yet they only interviewed representatives of major jurisdictions and the findings of their study imply that the “micro structural communication modalities” that contributed to perceptions of voice are in large part based on personality and pre-established relationships. How does understanding who is GOVERNING during wildfire response inform us about who and what is BEING GOVERNED?
Dunn et al want to offer a planning tool that incorporates social values by including diverse stakeholders and partners to rank values at risk and appropriate wildfire response (8). Who are these stakeholders and partners and how does this inclusion complicate management decisions and accountability, especially given the limited number of fire resources that might be available? Thinking, for example, with the Terwilliger Fire, where resources were concentrated on protecting private timber.
ReplyDeleteSteelman et al mentions that "Increasing Institutional Complexity in Formal Governance Will Hit a
Point of Diminishing Returns" (pg. 736). Have we already reached that point in some instances?
Dunn mentions breaking away from the "rigidity trap" (pg. 9) of fire management as being the central challenge for fire managers. Why is it so hard to break out of this trap created by the standards of 20th century fire suppression methods?
Paveglio et al mentioned tension between local and IC firefighters during the Columbia Complex Fire. In what situation should a local firefighter be able to contest IC commanders?
Paveglio et al. mentioned there were three phases for data analysis; the first phase interviews were conducted and transcribed word-for-word. How were these interviews transcribed; was there any softwares that were used in this process? If not, was there more than one individual transcribing interviews for an accurate transcription? It was also mentioned the interviews revealed the stakeholders who were critical of suppression efforts during the fire felt that way because they did not agree with or understand the logic behind IC teams resource allocation. What was the distinction between disagreeing and understanding the logic?
ReplyDeleteAs both Sasha and Steelman et al mentioned the question of who and what is being governed during wildfire response is fundamental. However, they also state the failure to be inclusive can affect the legitimacy of collaborative efforts. Is this statement contradicting themselves or what was the intention behind these two statements?
Steelman et al.
ReplyDeleteA recurring theme in many of these studies as that there is a lot of success that can be had in almost any situation if people with the right attitudes are involved (agency representatives, community organizers, incident command staff etc.). These big systems, especially NIMS are giant and evolve slowly- and usually as the result of catastrophic failures (Katrina is a good example). The actors within the system change more frequently than the system can hope to, should there be more of an emphasis on selecting and retaining people in these systems that can make up for where the system is lacking (ensuring that all involved have a voice in this case)?
It is pointed out that in cases where those outside formal roles had voice pre-established relationships and/or the ability to leverage the microstructures were key. I think this gets into some of the heart of the use of ICS- it’s not something that can simply be applied and then everyone learns to work with it. I think this gets to the finding that the implementation varies significantly. What would be the most successful way to make sure that the local stage is set (pre-established relationship, knowledge of how to leverage microstructures) for voices to be heard?
Paveglio et al.
Given the complexity of the conflict of the Columbia Complex fire were any of the outside responders (Incident command team) interviewed? It would be interesting to be able to attempt to line up the two perspectives to attempt to understand better how points of view, r perceptions were different. Just from my perception of the incident from reading the paper, the local culture of self-reliance didn’t seem to control the incident and outside help was necessary. Who requested the help? I’m interested to know if local resources requested help with an expectation, they could continue to operate independently…is that a reasonable expectation? I also see a need to reevaluate how values are prioritized in WUI fires, there is such a focus on structure when other resources (timber, agricultural, range) may be of far more value and create disparity if lost. Could some of this be due to fire reporting and statistics revolving around structures lost/threatened?
Paveglio et al., 2015: I would argue that structures have more agency than what structuration theory allows, which is that structures are constituted and reproduced by “rules and resources” of agents. An ICS command chain, for example, is full of actors but agential power rests mostly at the top where it is effectively insulated from the demands/voicings of agents both within and outside of ICS command. In this way, communication is largely precluded or destined to fail by the structure itself, and all the more so in the compressed time scale of a wildfire event. Locals thus feel deprived of their agency. So how might the two sides come together before crisis necessitates the imposition of rigid structures?
ReplyDeleteSteelman et al., 2021 argue that micro structures are sites/objects/relationships where the bureaucratic rubber of formal governance and its macro structures meets the road, meaning that micro elements are emergent or contingent upon macro structures finding traction in the chaos of real world hazard response. So how then do you formalize these micro structures? Assuming they can be formalized, how does one integrate them without initiating the diminishing returns of bureaucratic complexity (pg. 736)?
One way to facilitate adaption across fire prone multi-jurisdictional landscapes before large wildfires happen (Dunn et al., 2020) is through propaganda. Smokey Bear was a powerful tool that got people to individualize and internalize suppression at a scale not limited to the individual: it spoke to suppressing fire on the landscape as a whole. Why shouldn’t the FS spend millions on a PR campaign for mitigation? What would the messaging be?
Paveglio et al 2015
ReplyDeleteIt’s clear that local community members, particularly more rural landowners that rely on agriculture or natural resources for their living, want the option to be active participants in protecting their livelihoods. Could the ICS build in the capacity to enable these locals, or would their engagement have to be an “ad hoc” kind of agreement made by an Incident Commander? Is the main barrier to this kind of agreement the threat of post-fire litigation?
Dunn et al. 2020
Is it possible to reorient our timber, hazardous fuels, and fire management systems on federal lands around the concept of PODs, as the authors allude to? Is this something agencies should consider?
Steelman et al. 2021
In the discrepancy cases, where principals who were not formally recognized still felt that they had voice, the role/disposition of the Incident Command(s) seemed crucial. If the IC was amenable to involving other folks without a formal role there was a positive outcome. For those who have worked in the ICS, how common is it to have ICs with this amenable nature? Thinking about Andrew’s questions last week, are there trainings for ICs that go over these situations/relationships?
Dunn emphasizes the need for adaptive management and cooperation among agencies across multi-jurisdictional problems, but this remains the key to utilizing tools like PODs to their potential. Are there any outside incentives to achieve this cooperation? If not, what tools could be used to accelerate that relationship building, and where would those tools come from?
ReplyDeleteSteelman et al. identify microstructures as being essential to inclusive collaboration within the ICS system. These microstructures seem to be heavily reliant on relationships in place prior to the incident at hand. This mirrors old boy networks present across so many fields that can so often create barriers to entry or limit access to resources for those outside of the club. How do we balance the importance of informal relationships and the mobility they can provide with the potential limiting effects of these systems? Can these types of networks be formalized and maintain their effectiveness?
Paveglio
It is clear that residents of Dayton felt they were not given a voice in prioritizing values or decision making on the Columbia Complex fires. If the residents of Dayton had formal representation with the IMT (in the macro structures discussed in Steelman), were they let down by the ICS system or their representatives. Could any of the propositions discussed by Steelman resolved the issues in Dayton?
Agency mission statements:
USFS – “To sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the Nation’s forests and grasslands to meet the needs of present and future generations.”
NPS – “The National Park Service preserves unimpaired the natural and cultural resources and values of the National Park System for the enjoyment, education, and inspiration of this and future generations.
Cal Fire – “Serving and Safeguarding the People and Protecting the Property and Resources of California.”
Idaho Department of Lands – “Idaho Department of Lands Fire Management (IDL Fire) in partnership with two Timber Protection Associations and with the support of rural volunteer fire departments and other partners, are responsible for fire suppression and prevention on more than 6 million acres of state and private forests and rangelands in Idaho. IDL Fire focuses on initial attack with the goal of keeping fires at 10 acres or less.”
Oregon Department of Forestry – “To serve the people of Oregon by protecting, managing, and promoting stewardship of Oregon's forests to enhance environmental, economic, and community sustainability.”
There are some stark differences between the mission statements of these firefighting agencies, many of which have to frequently collaborate to achieve cross-jurisdictional goals. Are these differences a contributing factor to major points of conflict like we saw in Dayton? How can these differences be reconciled for efficient collaboration within ICS or for pre-fire engagement on PODs?
Paveglio et al. describe the duality of structure: people are both constrained by a structure and enabled to act by it. The Columbia Complex fire described here went type 1 within a few days, and the complex was preceded the year before with the School Fire, which burned up over 40 homes. Tensions in the area were likely already very high because of this. Type 1 and 2 IMTs are often in high demand and move around the country, so they don't always include local folks at the top planning levels. Could integrating local people and local knowledge into IMT planning structures help ease tension and allow more integration; for example, leaving a few trainee slots open for local fire managers to fill?
ReplyDeleteDunn et al. discuss the PNW risk assessment, which describes how value is placed on various resources. These values can be highly varied - just looking at the assessment shows everything from sawmills to trout. These values are then weighted via discussion and meetings. Can these values truly be averaged out, and will that average reflect risk, considering that what's good for one resource may be bad for another (e.g. wilderness areas seeming like a good place for managed fires but simultaneously having to maintain air quality standards that wouldn't allow for heavy burning?)
Steelman et al cite the need to make tradeoffs between inclusion and efficient decisionmaking. Are these things always mutually exclusive?
Chris Dunn's PODs presentation to the Inyo NF:
ReplyDeletehttps://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdrive.google.com%2Fdrive%2Ffolders%2F14LoHY7mNbiby1p9Z0bVAYuJD4B8li6Jz%3Fusp%3Dsharing&data=05%7C01%7C%7C91eabf4972474bebe49808db34557f12%7Ced5b36e701ee4ebc867ee03cfa0d4697%7C0%7C0%7C638161314028466130%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=jBqHAgFWSwNYDfeNA5Bh4Xy2flUC56NTBLlaXX4iGk4%3D&reserved=0
AGOL tool that allows the public to suggest changes to PODs:
https://gcc02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fosugisci.maps.arcgis.com%2Fapps%2Fwebappviewer%2Findex.html%3Fid%3D9d753da5679a4da986b48fae8ce157ae&data=05%7C01%7C%7C91eabf4972474bebe49808db34557f12%7Ced5b36e701ee4ebc867ee03cfa0d4697%7C0%7C0%7C638161314028309925%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=eI3wuEm9NLd1aEIwywyBp838xQF9YVcY2BKcpBoLhDM%3D&reserved=0