Remember that your comments and questions are due by noon on Monday before class. This provides enough time for our discussion leads to synthesize questions.
I look forward to our discussion.
Wildfire evacuation and response
Please enter at least three discussion questions based upon the assigned readings for this week. The structure of your questions and comments is up to you. Consider making recommendations about best practices for evacuation notification or coordination. Feel free to respond to other student posts and extend their ideas if you wish.
Remember that your comments and questions are due by noon on Monday before class. This provides enough time for our discussion leads to synthesize questions.
I look forward to our discussion.
Remember that your comments and questions are due by noon on Monday before class. This provides enough time for our discussion leads to synthesize questions.
I look forward to our discussion.
I enjoyed reading through McCaffrey et al. paper focusing on the decision making process: leave early, wait and see or stay and defend. It was interesting to learn/understand the decision of community members wanted to stay and defend or waiting to see. One questions I have is if there was a financial limitation to residents wanting to stay? If the residents don't have the financial means to travel to a safe destination will this increase their chances of taking preventative actions?
ReplyDeleteStasiewicz and Paveglio focused on the evacuation behaviors in response to complex wildfire events categorizing between stay and defend (SD) and shelter in place (SIP). Table 2 mentioned the evacuation statements, one statement that stood out to me was "I would not know what to do during a wildfire". Were any of these individuals within this category given the time to inform them of the importance of preventative actions? What precautions they would take in order to do their part? Also, it was mentioned older residents were most likely to be found in the SIP/I don't know category; were these residents physically capable of completing vegetation mitigation? Was there any assistance program to help these residents?
Li et al. focuses on the use of traffic simulation methods allowing the estimation of the total evacuation time for a threatened community. It is mentioned that the complexity of evacuation timing requires decision makers to make accurate decision would they have to consider the community members without reliable transportation to make a safe evacuation? Also, what approach would be taken if the residence only has one clear path to safety? Another question I have is the mentioning that it is assumed that all the residents in the study area receive warnings at the same time during the evacuation. How can they be positive that everyone has received these warnings?
Given the “human complexity” factor and the fact that wildfire evacuation does not equate to an orderly stream of vehicles away from danger and toward safe places, how useful is Li et al’s modeling tool? Is there a particular community archetype for which it would be most applicable? Or is the “expert judgment” of a local emergency manager still the best input for deciding evacuation trigger points?
ReplyDeleteIn McCaffrey et al the majority of respondents (70-80%) “did not have decision-making constraints such as children, disabilities or physical ailments, livestock” (1399). Does the lack of those constraints inflate the “wait and see” mentality? For both the McCaffrey and Stasiewicz and Paveglio studies, how do the hero-narratives and machismo of firefighting (along with able-bodiedness!) play into stay or go decision-making?
Dalyna, I appreciate so much the social justice emphasis of your questions!
McCaffrey et al found that physical cues are most relied upon by those who take the 'wait and see' approach. Could it be possible to implement further education that informs these individuals who choose to 'wait and see' should be acting on physical cues or will this approach always be problematic?
ReplyDeleteStasiewicz and Paveglio found in their study that participants in SD class were more likely to perform wildfire mitigation actions while those who indicated they would evacuate were less likely. To me, this suggests the public's perception is generally on the right track and additional effort may be best directed towards encouraging those who selected 'SIP/unsure' to clarify their decision. How could the precedent of 'early evacuation' be rephrased so one does not perceive it as being a long term, leave and never your might never come back, decision.
Stasiewics and Paveglio discuss the possibility of implementing further education on wildfire mitigation actions to those who choose to stay and defend. What might some consequences be of publishing a comprehensive list of mitigation actions if they do not prevail in the event of a wildfire and those who choose to stay experience tragedy.
The Stasiewicz & Paveglio article describes various emergency preference decisions (SD, SDLE, SIP) but combines the "shelter in place (SIP)" choice with the "I don't know" choice in tables 3-5. "Shelter in place" and "wait and see" seem like fairly different options and mindsets; the former seems to imply a planned action and the latter does not. Should these two options be separated for clarity? Why or why not?
ReplyDeleteIn the same article, the survey process sounds pretty rigorous, with researchers visiting properties in person and making as much effort as possible to administer questions and pick up results. This looks ike it paid off, with a higher response rate for the drop-off/pick-up surveys (78.3%) than I've seen in most papers. Would it be worth it to analyze those results separately from the mail-in results and see if there are differences in demographics and responses? Why/why not?
In the McCafferty et al. paper, authors note that multiple studies have found behavioral stability in evacuation responses - often, people will make the same choices over and over again. If this includes the large chunk of people who wait and see, what are some possible actions to take to motivate this group to take action, whether it is planning more safely for home defense or making evacuation plans? (And if this is not possible, why not?)
Li et al. 2019
ReplyDeleteDo people actually follow speed limits during emergencies (as implied by their methodology)?
Are there situations where trigger points associated with obvious geographic features may be beneficial (versus using calculated buffer distances)? The importance of physical cues is clearly important for some residents (McCaffrey et al., 2018). Maybe this paper was proposing to combine more appropriate buffer distances with geographic features and I missed it.
Stasiewicz and Paveglio 2021
Distributing evacuation notices is a concern in rural areas. What are the evacuation notification systems in place in PO county in Washington? What do these systems usually look like in rural counties vs more developed WUI areas?
Changes in public awareness of wildfire mitigation strategies are posited as a reason for the increase in mitigation behaviors taken by the SD residents in this study compared to SD residents in a study from 2011. Do you think this should be considered a positive change considering the “evacuate” and “wait and see” residents did not change their behavior? A related idea is brought up as a potential problem in McCaffrey et al. (2018). “…an unintended consequence of encouraging such mitigation efforts may be that they make individuals feel they have more leeway in their decision process (i.e., a potential false sense of security to delay evacuation).”
Which categorization of WUI residents did you feel captured the evacuation strategies best (McCaffrey’s 2 categories in which a portion of “evacuate” and “stay and defend” would wait and see, or Stasiewicz and Paveglio’s 3 categories; evacuate, wait and see, stay and defend)?
Stasiewicz and Paveglio
ReplyDeleteWhat stood out the most to me was that the dependence of perception on evacuation decisions. How accurate are resident’s perceptions of their own abilities and preparedness? A self-reported survey alone will not provide this answer but a follow up skills assessment would be interesting. How many people bought a generator but never started it? Or have a pump and sprinkler system but have not set it up? I’m thinking of it like a first aid kit- it is not good enough to simply buy one and put it on the shelf, you need to know what is in it and how to use it all before you need to. It’s a much more difficult research question that would take more resources to address, and would be further complicated by the respondents willing to show potential weaknesses. Perhaps a training or “citizen academy” event could be organized that has participants rate their perceived competence or preparedness and compares that with results of a skill pretest (start a pump, estimate rate-of-spread, estimate wind direction and speed, identify water supply etc.).
McCaffrey et. al.
What sticks with me in this paper carries over from previous weeks- nonresponse. I like that they pointed out in the discussion that there should be caution used in applying the results. I would like to see complimentary studies to take on the hard task of trying to identify patterns in non-response. Are there common threads in say census data, data from past fires such as structure damage or insurance claims. I wonder if agencies keep records on who has/hasn’t evacuated during past events. Especially considering the topic I feel like non-response is a response and could indicate an evacuation behavior- its just going to take more time and resources to sus out. With the identification of concern about the wait and see group I would be concerned that non-respondents may fall into that category.
Li and Cova
I feel like this paper outlines a valuable tool for decision making by incident commanders and other authorities (not just wildfire but all hazard considerations). I agree that relying on expert judgement alone- especially in high stress, time compressed incidents is not wise. Using models like this in planning would be especially helpful in having worked out the details of the most likely scenarios. It would be interesting to see if there is room for the addition of real time information gathering during evacuations to improve situational awareness and provide data for improving models. I am thinking of gathering data on traffic flows and patterns much like is already being done using cell phone data or traffic cameras during rush hour times. Could a GISS or other position within the situation unit have access to cell phone data to traffic movement, or potentially add traffic sensors on evacuation routes?
Over 80% of respondents agreed with the statement that they would evacuate when authorities told them to do so while over 60% agreed with the statement they would stay and defend their property by putting out spot fires (Stasiewicz and Paveglio). How can these two stated preferences be reconciled? Can we predict actual behavior given this conflict?
ReplyDeleteMcCaffrey et al. found that the “wait and see” group was most affected by physical cues. If the goal is to motivate this group to leave earlier, what are some practices communities could implement to encourage that? Could something like an alarm system be effective?
Li et al. are proposing a real-time simulation of predicted fire behavior and traffic flow to establish trigger points and implement evacuation plans. This type of model would require input of many variables, almost all of which could change very rapidly. It would also have dynamic outputs that the public would not necessarily be able to predict. Is this type of plan the most effective way to keep people safe? Would communities be better off identifying safety zones (parking lots, irrigated grass, etc…) that could be permanently identified and signed?