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Please enter at least three discussion questions based upon the assigned readings for this week. Questions can focus on the substance of the papers, implications for policy, applications to management, critiques of conclusions, inquires about methods, etc.
If you have particular issues, challenges, or scenarios that you would like to explore given your experience or interest, please state those in your comments. The class could discuss your particular example and use it as a way to develop our shared capacity.
Thanks for the good discussion last week. I look forward to more.
Remember that your comments and questions are due by noon on Monday before class. This provides enough time for our discussion leads to synthesize questions.
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ReplyDeleteFor Ulrich Beck, one of the social theorists cited by Essen et al. (2022), environmental risk is a production of modern society (as a byproduct of its lifestyle but also as a product that can be commodified) rather than a hazard extrinsic to it. The risk of wildland fire, for example, is highly manufactured in the sense that much of it stems from human actions and landscape modifications. The 'reactivity' of simple risk can therefore be viewed as manufactured: it is a built-in response backed by a high degree of technical and financial support. Far from being reactive, the production of simple risk involves an industrial apparatus with a controlling “monopol[y] over interpretation” (Essen et al., 2022, p. 13) that includes the very interpretation of risk. The complex risk paradigm advanced here is well aware of this issue and suggests that the monopolizing tendency can be overcome through social and ecological diversification. My question is whether diversity is enough to break the “stickiness” of institutionalized reactivity? Can complexity or complexifying dismantle pre-existing power structures if those same structures are allowed to persist as part of managing for social and ecology diversity?
ReplyDeleteSecond question: Slovic et al. (2004) addresses the difficulty of achieving cognitive and affective resonance within risk management. One feature of the risk paradigm and analytic thinking about the environment more generally is that events like fire become framed as uncertainties or probabilities; fire is a likelihood that is empirically absent until it becomes present. Even the language of fire’s “return interval” lends itself to a probabilistic understanding of the environment/environmental processes. In the context of fire management and public awareness, what strategies might be used to reframe the risk of fire from being about occurrence or frequency to being about degree (severity, intensity)?
ReplyDeleteHow does re-framing the “wildfire problem” as a “home ignitions problem” fit with Essen et al’s argument for risk complexity? Though it flips responsibility, does it perpetuate an over-simplification of both values and risk?
ReplyDeleteEssen et al include technocratic and operational hierarchies as elements of a simple risk paradigm and collaborative networks as integral to the complex risk paradigm. This complex paradigm emphasizes socio-political actions rather than structures: embrace, engage, process, include, invite, distribute. Why is this focus on action important and what kinds of structures (socio-political or otherwise) could support their implementation?
Slovic et al argue that an emotional, experiential risk response is “natural” and “common”, offering several example studies in which people “felt” they had a better chance, “imaging the numerator”, responding to percentages and probabilities non-rationally, ignoring the possibility of lung cancer when a young person. How does their evolutionary characterization of “risk as feeling” (“ancient instincts”) and “risk as analysis” (“modern scientific”) support or complicate paradigms of risk that prioritize economic values? What other interpretations of their risk-response examples could be made?
Calkin preaches the necessity of altering home ignition probability and education about the home ignition zone (HIZ) as a key mechanism to overcoming home loss in wildfire events. What are the barriers to implementation? Are homeowners in the WUI financially able to act on this suggestion? What attitudes exist in these communities that would promote or inhibit efforts to change home flammability on a large scale?
ReplyDeleteDoes the HIZ idea exemplify the simple risk approach by arguing a straightforward, one-dimensional solution to the wildland fire problem is reducing flammability of structures likely to experience fire?
Do the suggestions in the Essen paper require the framework of complex risk? Would this message be more effectively communicated by just advocating for shared decision making, shareholder engagement, etc?
Wildfire clearly invokes the affect heuristic, bringing to mind images associated with negative outcomes, which impact risk management and decision making. How does the affect heuristic play into Complex Risk Managements’ focus on integrating a wide variety of voices and stakeholders from a community? What are the pros and cons in this context?
I've enjoyed learning more about the complexity of risk management through this week's readings. I haven't thought about risk into detail before, previous courses only cover the fundamentals such as preventative risk management. However, I would like to discuss figure 1. in the Calkin et al paper to understand how others understand the conceptual model from their own background/knowledge in wildfire. Two questions I did have was stated in the Essen et al paper discusses "complex risk" with the five risks that are most effectively addressing by concerning. Will the definition of "risk" change depending on the situation that is occurring? The next question is how/will focusing on risk management help increase preventative management in possibly "every" situation?
ReplyDeleteI found the Slovic et al article helpful, specifically in thinking about how to behave while considering risk analysis in a group situation. I ended up drawing a 4 part grid in the margins that summarized figure three in terms of the benefit/risk dynamics. I think it is both useful when understanding my own ideas of risk, but also in listening to the ideas of others. I thought of last week’s conversation about the idea that “logging is the solution to fire” and I think it’s a good example of when the affect heuristic may be standing in the way of managing wildfire as a complex risk. How do we in cases like this work to rebalance the affect with the analytic?
ReplyDeleteEssen et al was a lot for me to process. One of the pieces that was sticking in my head was the identification of NIMS and ICS as a top-down simple risk approach. I agree with this statement, yet I would argue that it can become a framework that is similarly suited to both situations where a simple risk approach (rescue, evacuation, immediate life safety type problems) as well as complex risk approach situations (property, resources, environment). I recently took ICS 300 and 400 classes that focus on large scale incidents that require things like area coordination (high complexity is the word they used). There is a place at the table bult in for the policy makers in these incidents, in the all hazards world it is usually the higher level officials such as city and county administrators, as well as the elected policy makers. I think that the existing framework can be further modified in a way that involves a complex risk approach before a wildfire (or really any disaster) as well as ensuring that as the event progresses it is managed and approached in a complex way guided by the shared power of local stakeholders. My biggest question is would it be possible that incident management teams be trained as facilitators of this process rather than controlling it? Might the role of incident commander in a complex risk approach be to execute the objectives as laid out and approved by the policy makers (community, local resource managers etc)? I think the biggest question is when outside resources are needed is it possible to pivot from the traditional one size fits all tactics of the past and have them execute the best fit for the local area that is dictated by local priorities (the example of protecting fences over structures). I think one of the big challenges will not as much be the pivot to complex risk analysis, but will be making sure it doe not get pushed out and unraveled by simple risk analysis in the heat of the moment and undermining effectiveness.
1. The experiential system overpowers the analytic system when it comes to wildfire risk acceptance. This effect is strong enough that for many people it may act as a barrier to taking an analytical approach. How can we introduce an analytical approach to the public discourse of fire management? Does the experiential perspective need to be more positive to increase cohesion in support for fire management?
ReplyDelete2. Calkin states: “Although wildfires are inevitable, the destruction of homes, ecosystems, and lives is not.” Given current community expansion into the wildland urban interface, do you believe this is a true statement? If not, can it be made true?
3. Have we hit the tipping point from simple risk to complex risk? Is the complex risk model digestible to the general public? Would a simple risk model be easier to acquire funding and garner support for?
I found Calkin et al 2014's point about the wildfire paradox as highly in line with my personal views of the wildfire problem which is that wildfire suppression ultimately creates an ecosystem susceptible to extreme wildfire. This leads me to believe that wildfire may never be completely eliminated from the WUI, so maybe the next best thing is to construct housing in the WUI entirely with fire resistant materials?
ReplyDeleteIn reference to Essen et al 2022's article, I agree that wildfire would be best managed using a complex risk approach because it encourages adaptation of wildfire mitigation to be best fit for a given environment. One concern I have with using a complex risk approach is a potential for prolonging the sluggish system of policy implementation. Thoughts?
What information might an individual living in modern society be using to form there perception of wildfire risk?