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Please remember that the point of your submitted questions is to "hone in" on specialized topics, ideas, or concepts that we might be able to apply to improved wildfire management. Therefore, think about posing some of your questions as the potential for application to real-world settings, policy, or tools designed to improve the management of wildfire risk. If you prefer to discuss how the article influenced your conception of wildfire risk, policy, or practice, that is great. Pose those thoughts as the questions that the article caused you to think about.
If you have particular issues, challenges, or scenarios that you would like to explore given your experience or interest, please state those in your comments. The class could discuss your particular example and use it as a way to develop our shared capacity.
Remember that your comments and questions are due by noon on Monday before class. This provides enough time for our discussion leads to synthesize questions.
I got lost in the web of terminology mobilized by Wibbenmayer and Robertson (hazard, exposure, vulnerability, distribution, incidence, value, burden) and had difficulty discerning what, if anything, they are advocating. For example, they state that their study will “offer insights into the degree which wildfire management has influenced the distribution of exposure to wildfires over this period” (3). Here, they seem to use “exposure” in terms of property values, the primary focus of their study. Later, Wibbenmeyer and Robertson suggest that wealthy high hazard communities have the capability to efficiently organize suppression infrastructure, which to my mind, reduces “exposure”, even if "hazard" remains the same. Yet they go on to say: “With respect to environmental justice, our findings indicate that, overall, exposure to wildfire hazard differs from exposure to anthropogenic hazards such as pollution or waste facilities, which disproportionately affect vulnerable communities” (7). (With respect to environmental justice, I take issue with their suggestions a. that exposure to these anthropogenic hazards is determined by “household choice” and b. that wildfire is NOT an anthropogenic hazard.) But to my question, are the authors here using the term “exposure” solely as it equates to property values? And do either of the terms “exposure” or “vulnerability”, as used here, take into account the ability to recover?
ReplyDeleteWhat is the range of methods considered valid for social science in relationship to wildfire? Does it include both quantitative and qualitative data sets? Do social science studies run into similar constraints (such as lack of longevity, due to lack of funding?) as natural science studies? McCaffrey cites a study that found an increased sense of community and shared goals following participation in a structured program, leading the authors’ to conclude that this was the most efficient way to build community preparedness (86). What kind of follow-up work could be done to judge long-term effects of such programs on preparedness?
McCaffrey describes “place attachment” as indicative of who stays and who goes (86), while Paveglio describes two populations with whom Firewise programs are more or less successful (628), which might correlate to McCaffrey’s categories. These populations (or communities) more likely to evacuate or more likely to want to stay and defend their property may intersect and overlap across a geographic region. While the option to stay may not be reasonable in some regions, and in western Oregon, for example, seems to be considered a hindrance to fire management, could the option to stay (and be prepared to do so) actually build community cohesiveness and more PRO-ACTIVE “fire-adapted communities”? (I’d like to hear more about the RFPAs in Idaho!)
I would it hope it goes without saying that wildfire does not discriminate between races or income brackets, so I found Wibbenmeyer and Robertson’s paper to be somewhat separated from the basis of wildfire management. Regardless, I do acknowledge that in recent years there appears to be more support towards higher income communities impacted by wildfires. In my opinion it is not fair to pass on a fee to lower income communities that happen to reside in high-risk areas. How can funding for wildfire management be distributed to lower income communities who’s assets generally less valuable when compared to nearby high income communities.?
ReplyDeleteCan the problem of funding wildfire management in lower income communities be avoided by creating a broader goal which focuses on creating a fire resilient ecosystem across entire communities and avoids the consideration of income and race?
McCaffrey’s article reported a level of acceptance towards the use of mechanical thinning and prescribed fire to manage forest based on a survey conducted in three Midwest states and four western states (20). If this is the case, has there been an adequate amount of wildfire mitigation conducted as a result of this positive feedback?
In the article "Community Wildfire Preparedness," authors share research suggesting that local context is necessary to prepare a community for fire, since risk perception is often based on context and local values. Is it possible to create written policy that supports adding a liberal amount of local context, or would creating a template result in people simply following the template without digging deeply enough for this local context? What might that type of policy look like? (Could be similar to operational PODs since we discussed that last week)
ReplyDeleteIn "Community Wildfire Preparedness", authors mention new findings on place attachment. I was curious about this since it didn't come with a definition, so I looked it up and found this definition on the University of Washington's Urban Forestry page: "the person-to-place bonds that evolve through emotional connection, meaning, and understandings of a specific place." However, some WUI communities are very seasonal and have a lot of structures that are AirBnBs and second/third homes (for example Aspen CO). Is there a way to encourage place attachment for people living in these areas who may not live there year-round, or to give more agency to year-round residents who may be renters or lower-income than the ski crowd?
Has anyone had a positive or negative experience with university or agency extension programs, such as the ones described in "From Checkers to Chess" that shaped or changed your view on fire? If so, what was it?
I found this line from McCaffrey’s summary of Brekert-Smith et al. (2013) on how information sourcing influences risk perception to be pretty interesting: “Only information from neighbors and friends was associated with both probability and consequence ratings'' (p.85). This suggests that information sourced from peers has the greatest capacity to concretize risk and, in a way, bridge the affective-analytic gap fretted over by Slovic et al. However, given that the vast majority of information readily available for consumption is non-local in origin (in sourcing as well as in content), how can peer-sourced information be made available in pre and post-fire managerial contexts? Does the current town hall meeting framework facilitate this? If so, has there been any measure of success?
ReplyDeleteThis is more speculative but, following McCaffrey’s brief discussion of the role place attachment plays in social dynamics, do people think strength of place attachment is positively or negatively correlated with fire resiliency? In other words, are place attachments foregrounded in specific spatio-temporal or aesthetic landscapes (one’s house being surrounded by mature mixed conifer stands, for example) for which fire is viewed as a threat, or, are these attachments fluid enough to allow drastic landscape changes (as in post-fire) without loss of attachment? I understand these values are culturally relative but I think it would be interesting to chew on some anecdotal evidence.
The responses by Sasha and Greyson to Wibbenmayer reminded me of an infamous Mike Davis essay, "The Case for Letting Malibu Burn", in which he describes an instance where those who are most "vulnerable" or "exposed" to wildland fire (in Wibbenmeyer and Robertson's sense) are not by accident the very groups who can assume the most amount of risk (apologies for the length):
Delete"Ultimately the 1956 fire—followed by two blazes, one month apart, in 1958–59 that severely burned eight firefighters and destroyed another hundred homes—proved the beginning of the end for bohemian Malibu. A perverse law of the new fire regime was that fire now stimulated both development and upward social succession. By declaring Malibu a federal disaster area and offering blaze victims tax relief as well as preferential low-interest loans, the Eisenhower administration established a precedent for the public subsidization of firebelt suburbs. Each new conflagration would be punctually followed by reconstruction on a larger and even more exclusive scale as land use regulations and sometimes even the fire code were relaxed to accommodate fire “victims.” As a result, renters and modest homeowners were displaced from areas like Broad Beach, Paradise Cove, and Point Dume by wealthy pyrophiles encouraged by artificially cheap fire insurance, socialized disaster relief, and an expansive public commitment to “defend Malibu.”
Link to the essay in case anybody wants to read it: https://longreads.com/2018/12/04/the-case-for-letting-malibu-burn/
In the McCaffrey paper (2015) "interviews were conducted after Black Saturday 48% of residents interviewed had planned to stay and defend, 24% had planned to leave, and the remainder either had no plan or planned to wait and see." I wonder if the residents who decided to leave once a wildfire occurred were more financially stable making the decision to leave easier? Another question that came to mind was if there were new residents in the area that were less aware or educated about potential wildfires occurring? If so would this affect their decision to leave or stay?
ReplyDeleteI was confused throughout the Wibbenmeyer & Robertson (2022) they mentioned "address concerns of the 'Ecol. fallacy; under which the use of more aggregate data may mask relationships between demographics & environmental characteristics at finer spacial scales" I wondered how does demographic groups determine the risk of wildfires? I struggled with this thought throughout my readings.
Lastly in the Paveglio (2021) paper I appreciated the mentioned of "increasingly characterize social or "systems" science" there are countless papers who use these terms simultaneously with different meanings and can be confusing for some readers. Also, reading the title I was confused with the metaphor of "From Checkers to Chess" however, after background of the metaphor helped me understand this more clearly.
Wibbenmeyer and Robertson
ReplyDeleteI feel like this paper is the start of an idea of the distribution of wildfire risk, but I have a lot of questions about the data and interpretation. How many of these properties are primary residence as opposed to second (or more) properties such as a vacation property, cabin, etc.? Should that be taken into consideration?
Per capita income- wouldn’t even a small proportion of a population having a high income have a disproportionate effect on the per capita? I tend to feel like this value is likely inflated.
This paper looks at important points, however applying them broadly to the western US is of little use when management need to take place on a local scale using the specific values and circumstances of the area. Could this paper have been better presented using local examples and providing a framework that any group could use to get a useable data set based on the local situation?
McCaffrey
I found the fact that Australia’s focused on decision making during the fire interesting. Specific tragedies seem to have profound impacts on public perception and policy, in this case Black Saturday in Australia. How often are these tragedies considered for a period of time and after some time of action, they eventually fade from the collective memory when their lessons may be more timeless and worth considering long after the event?
Another point I considered was on page 85, “individuals turn to information sources they are most familiar with, whether or not the source provides useful information.” I think that this is an important consideration, however public entities- specifically the bigger organizations such as federal and state may have restrictive policies on social media and what can be posted. The city I live in has social media accounts for the police and fire departments that provide real time information during incidents, however the entity (a public commission) I work for has very strict social media policies that prohibit social media use by specific departments, and rely on the overall entity for social media communication. What are possible solutions to this problem? I can see the establishment of local organizations with government participation as a potential way to circumnavigate this, but that may not work in every situation.
A distinction is drawn between two groups of WUI residents in Paveglio (2021): a group of private landowners that have recently moved to the WUI and rural populations with historic ties to place and a more extractive mentality. Forest restoration and fuel reductions get a lot of attention in the discussion of wildfire adapted communities, but what are the land management tactics that appeal to the later group of WUI residents? Is it as simple as timber harvesting or are there other programs that are acceptable to these communities and have they received enough attention in discussions of wildfire adapted communities?
ReplyDeleteThe idea of local organizers who promote collaboration towards wildfire resilience and preparedness in communities has been successful in the past. At what scale are these fire-adaptation coordinators most effective or ineffective? Is this position most effective if rooted in a relatively limited community setting or can they be effective at jumping boards to different scales of government and landscape?
I found it interesting that the results from Wibbenmeyer and Robertson (2022) changed depending on if the results were framed in terms of people vs area of land. We find that because higher property value high wildfire hazard areas tend to be denser, most high wildfire hazard areas across the western US comprise relatively low value properties (figure 4). How does this finding pertain to the research that shows higher value properties receive more suppression efforts? Do these sparsely populated areas need a different approach as suggested by Paveglio (2021)?